13 December, 2025
Reflections on the Evolution of my Martial Arts Training
16 November, 2025
Lawfare: Two Questions
Although lawfare has customarily been considered to be an adjunct of and appurtenant to traditional warfare as Colonel Charles Dunlap noted in his seminal paper entitled "Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts" presented at Humanitarian Challenges in Military Interventions Conference (November 29, 2001).
I have been reflecting upon the two attempted impeachments of President Trump during his first term, and the fallout from the events of 6 January 2021 including the aborted legal case of United States v. Trump. When I consider these events in conjunction with the actions taken against prominent Democrats and other opponents of President Trump since his inauguration in January of 2025; two questions come to my mind immediately.
First, should the definition of lawfare be expanded to encompass such exercises in hyper partisanship regardless of whether they happen internationally or domestically?
Second, the actions taken by President Trump and his Justice Department against prominent members of the Democratic Party who oppose his policies such as Letitia James, Adam Schiff and others constitute an exercise in lawfare? Likewise, did the two failed impeachment attempts during President Trump's first term and the legal consequences arising out of the events that occurred on 6 January 2021 also qualify as an example of lawfare?
15 November, 2025
Evelyn Grace Heath
Cho Dan Essay
11 November, 2025
Compromise a Repost because of the Shutdown
07 November, 2025
Moo Do Creed
06 November, 2025
Special Education further Thoughts
05 November, 2025
The Relationship between Martial Arts and Politics II
The Relationship between Martial Arts and Politics I
21 January, 2023
The Evolution of Judicial Review Part Two: The Constitutional Convention
Table 1:
Judicial and Legal Aspects of the Four Plans Developed at the Constitutional
Convention
|
Aspects |
The Virginia Plan (Randolph) [1] |
The South Carolina Plan (Pinckney) [2] |
The New Jersey Plan (Paterson) [3] |
The New York Plan (Hamilton) [4] |
|
Federal Judiciary Structure |
Bifurcated with multiple supreme tribunals and an indeterminate
number of inferior |
Bifurcated with a single supreme tribunal and an indeterminate
number of inferior |
Bifurcated with a single supreme tribunal and an indeterminate
number of inferior |
Bifurcated with a single supreme tribunal and an indeterminate
number of inferior courts including a number of specialty |
|
Nomination/Appointment Process |
Judges are appointed by the national |
Judges are appointed by the |
Judges are appointed by the national |
Judges are nominated by the national executive and subject to
confirmation by the |
|
Judicial Tenure |
Judges remain on the bench during good behavior without set term |
Judges remain on the bench during good behavior without set term |
Judges remain on the bench during good behavior without set term |
Judges remain on the bench during good behavior without set term |
|
Judicial Salaries |
A fixed salary which cannot be altered during the tenure of a |
A fixed salary which cannot be altered during the tenure of a |
A fixed salary which cannot be altered during the tenure of a |
A fixed salary which cannot be altered during the tenure of a |
|
Federal Supremacy Clause |
Yes |
Although, plan presented by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney did not
possess a federal supremacy clause, he supported the development of such a clause [5] |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Jurisdiction |
The supreme court would exercise only appellate jurisdiction in
all cases of national concern. Original jurisdiction would be vested in the
inferior federal |
The supreme court would have original jurisdiction in cases of impeachment, and in cases affecting ambassadors or
other public ministers the Jurisdiction. In all other federal cases they
would exercise only appellate jurisdiction. |
The supreme court would have appellate jurisdiction in all
federal questions except impeachments. The only time the supreme court would have
original jurisdiction would be in cases of impeachment. In all other federal cases original
jurisdiction would vest in the inferior courts with trials being adjudicated
according to common law. |
The supreme court would have original jurisdiction in prize and
capture cases only, and appellate jurisdiction in revenue cases only. All other questions would be left to the national courts created
by Congress in the various states to address topics of national |
|
Power of Judicial Review |
Yes, of federal laws only. Under this plan the national
executive and the national judiciary combined to form a council of revision. The power to override conflicting state laws rested with the
national legislature. |
No, under this plan the power to review acts of the national
legislature was vested in the national |
None |
No under this plan the power of review is left to the chief
executives of the several |
|
Size |
Determined by the |
Determined by the |
Determined by the |
Constitutionally |
On matters of judicial appointments, Governor Randolph of Virginia and General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina [6] favored the idea of granting exclusive power over national judicial appointments to the national legislature. Conversely, James Madison, William Paterson, and James Wilson opposed giving the legislature control over judicial nominations, initially preferring to impart the power over national judicial nominations to the national executive. Compare: the ninth resolve of Governor Randolph’s Virginia Plan [7], advocating vesting the authority over judicial nominations in the national legislature against the fifth resolve of The New Jersey Plan [8] presented by William Paterson. The New York Plan presented by Alexander Hamilton, the only delegate from New York to attend the entire Convention brokered a compromise in that under his plan the members of the supreme court would be appointed by the national executive but would be subject to confirmation by the national legislature.[9]
Another
aspect of the proposed judiciary provoked an intense debate that reflected the
diversity of views on the part of the delegates attending the Convention was
jurisdiction. For example, the New Jersey
Plan[10]
proposed by William Paterson provided the proposed high court with only
appellate jurisdiction, while Virginia Plan [11]
advanced by Edmund Randolph granted the supreme tribunal original jurisdiction
in cases involving the national interest. Robert Yates’ summary of Judge James Wilson’s speech
comparing and contrasting the Virginia
and New Jersey Plans of governance offer
a clear summation and contrast between the views of the major participants at
the Convention on jurisdictional questions related to national judiciary, see: (Max
Farrand, 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 pp. 260-261) (4 vols.)
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). Of all the plans presented Hamilton’s
proposal was by far the most restrictive in that it would have granted the
supreme court original jurisdiction in only prize and capture cases, while,
extending its appellate competence to cover only revenue cases, see: Max Farrand, 1 The
Records of Federal Convention of 1787 291-292 (4 vols.) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
The right
of the national government to override state laws that conflicted with national
laws caused some controversy. Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, and Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney supported the inclusion of a federal law supremacy clause
as a means through which national laws could be enforced uniformly, see: Max Farrand, 1 The
Records of Federal Convention of 1787 162-164 (4 vols.) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). Conversely,
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and Hugh Williamson of North Carolina opposed
the inclusion of a supremacy. Gerry contended that such a grant of power to the
federal government was unnecessary on the grounds that he believed remonstrance
from the national government to the offending state would be sufficient to keep
them in check, and if they remained obdurate that the nation government could
use justifiable force to bring about compliance with national laws. Conversely,
Williamson argued that such a grant of power to the national government would
impinge on the ability of the states to develop their own laws and policies,
id: Max Farrand, 1 The Records of
Federal Convention of 1787 165 (4 vols.) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
Between July 24 and July 26, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
submitted the following resolutions concerning the judiciary to the Committee
of Detail
11.
Resolved that a national Judiciary be established To consist of One supreme
Tribunal. The Judges of which to shall be appointed by the second Branch
of the national Legislature. To hold their Offices during good behaviour. To
receive, punctually, at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in
which no enerease or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Persons
actually in Office at the time of such enerease or diminution.
12.
Resolved that the national Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior
Tribunals.
13.
Resolved that the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases
with respect to the collection of the national revenue: impeachments of any
national Officers: arising under laws passed by the general Legislature,
and to such other questions which as involve the National peace and
harmony. (Jensen, Kaminski, & Saladino,
1976, pp. 259-260)
Those delegates favored the inclusion of a supremacy clause won the debate
over inclusion after agreeing to leave the details related to the article to
the Committee of Leftovers, (The Brearly Committee) tasked with developing
proposals to resolve outstanding issues that could not be resolved by the Committee
of Detail. Neither of the drafts submitted to the Committee of Style by the
Committee of Detail on August 6, 1787, or September 10, 1787, contained provisions
for supremacy clause [12], or judicial review. Interestingly,
the topic of judicial review was never raised during the debates of the
Constitutional Convention. The only mention of the subject occurred in the
notes taken by James Wilson during the proceedings of the Committee of Detail
as illustrated by the following passage found in the second volume of The Records of Federal Convention of 1787.
COMMITTEE
OF DETAIL IV
….
<Insert the 11 Article>
(All
laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void, and in the
decision thereon, which shall be vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents
without which the general principles cannot be satisfied shall be considered,
as involved in the general principle.) (Max Farrand, 2 The Records of Federal
Convention of 1787 p. 144) (4 vols.) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1967, 144).
The
Brearly Committee decided to include a supremacy clause within the final draft
of the proposed constitution, an explicit provision for judicial review was
ultimately omitted from the final versions of the text that became Articles II,
III, and VI of the Constitution of the United States. The final versions of Article
II, Section 2, Paragraph 2[13] Article III,[14]
and Article VI, Clause 2[15]
of the Constitution of the United States concerning the appointment of federal
judges and the jurisdictional competence of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the supremacy of federal
laws were produced by the Committee of Style, and approved by the
Convention as a Committee of the Whole reflected the compromise reached by the
Committee of Leftovers, (The Brearly Committee) tasked with developing
proposals to resolve outstanding issues.
The
form of Article III that emerged from the Constitutional Convention endowed the
Supreme Court of the United States with original jurisdiction in nine types of
cases.
1.
Cases concerning federal questions.
2.
Litigation involving foreign dignitaries.
3.
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.
4.
Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party.
5.
Lawsuits between two or more States.
6.
Actions between a State and Citizens
of another State; —
7.
Proceedings between Citizens of
different States; —
8.
Disputes brought by Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
9.
And between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.[16]
In
all other cases the Supreme Court of the United States was invested with
appellate jurisdiction.[17]
Under
the terms of Article VII, of the Constitution nine states had to ratify the
text of nine states before the Constitution would enter into force. New
Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution approved the
Constitution on June 21, 1788, nine months after the Convention closed. Despite
the entry into force of the Constitution; adherents and opponents of the new
Constitution understood that the failure of Virginia, New York, and North
Carolina
[1] MAX
FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 20-22(4 vols.) (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966)
[2] For
Pinckney’s Plan of government see: MAX FARRAND 3 The Records of Federal
Convention of 1787 595-609(4 vols.) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
[3] MAX
FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 242-246(4 vols.) (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
[4] MAX
FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 291-292(4 vols.) (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) and MAX FARRAND 3 The Records of Federal Convention
of 1787 619-630(4 vols.) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
[5]
See: MAX FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787, 164(4 vols.) (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
[6]
For Pinckney’s Plan of government see: MAX FARRAND 3 The Records of Federal
Convention of 1787 595-609(4 vols.) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1967).
[7] MAX
FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 20-22, at 21(4 vols.) (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
[8] MAX
FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 242-246, at 244(4 vols.)
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
[9] MAX
FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 291-292(4 vols.) (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
[10]
MAX FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 242-246(4 vols.)(Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
[11] MAX
FARRAND 1 The Records of Federal Convention of 1787 20-22, at 21(4 vols.) (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
[12] Jensen,
M., Kaminski, J. P., & Saladino, G. J. (Eds.). (1976). The Documentary
History of the Constitution: Volume I - Constitutional Documents and Records,
1776-1787 (Vol. One) of Thirty-One. Madison, Wisconsin, United States of
America: State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
[13]
U.S. Const. art. II § 2, para. 2 (1788)
[14] U.S.
Const. art. III (1788) amended by U.S.
Const. amend XI (1795).
[15]
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (1788).
[16] U.S.
Const. art. III (1788) amended by U.S.
Const. amend XI (1795). The Eleventh Amendment restricted the ability of an
individual to bring a lawsuit against a state by narrowing the circumstances
under which a state could be sued by an individual.
[17] U.S.
Const. art. III (1788) amended by U.S.
Const. amend XI (1795).
15 January, 2023
The Evolution of Judicial Review Part One: 1775-1787
Part One: The Pre-Constitutional Convention Period 1775-1787
In the 247 years since the Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence, the several states have operated under three forms of governments. First, from July 4, 1776, until February 28, 1781. The states operated as thirteen independent nations who sent delegates to the Continental Congress for the purposes of developing a common policy on matters of mutual concerns. Second, from March 1, 1781, to June 21, 1788, the thirteen independent states operated under a decentralized confederal system under the Articles of Confederation which reserved the majority of the power to the individual states. With the entry in to force of the Constitution on June 21, 1788, the system of government was transformed into the dual federalist system that exists in slightly altered form today.
Benjamin Franklin proposed the first version of a confederal form of government to the Second Continental Congress on July 21, 1775. [ 1] Contemporaneous with the resolution of independence (Lee Resolution) presented by Richard Henry Lee on June 7, 1776. The Second Continental Congress appointed a committee of thirteen members to study and prepare a draft of a confederation agreement.[2] Given the nature of the task, the Continental Congress assigned a delegate from each colony to the committee so that each of the colonies giving each colony a voice in the construction of the agreement. Article XIII, paragraph 2 of the proposed Articles of Confederation reported to Continental Congress sitting as a committee of the whole and transmitted to the States for ratification required the accession of all thirteen States before the confederal system would enter into force. The ratification process began on November 17, 1777, when the Congress transmitted the proposed to the colonies for approval.[3] The exigencies presented by the American Revolution prevented a rapid process. The Articles of Confederation did not enter into until March 1, 1781 when the delegation of Maryland to the Continental Congress subscribed to the document.[4] Under the confederal system established by the Articles of Confederation, the several States retained their status as thirteen independent sovereign nations who collaborated on issues of mutual concern by ceding their authority on military and foreign policy matters to the Congress of the Confederation (the United States in Congress assembled) as provided by the Articles of Confederation of 1781, Article VI, and Article IX respectively. The construction of the Articles of Confederation and the political organ created under its terms gave rise to several defects, which ultimately prompted the convening of the Annapolis Convention of 1786 and the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
Many of the delegates to Annapolis Convention of 1786 and the Constitutional Convention of 1787 agreed on the need for a multi-tiered national judiciary composed of courts possessing original and appellate jurisdiction. However, they were divided on several technical questions pertaining to the formation of the new judiciary, and the modifications to the underlying legal system necessary to create the new system. Among the questions that caused the most division were questions related to three subjects: First, the delegates disagreed on the manner of judicial appointments; Second, the members held divergent views on the apportionment of jurisdiction among the original and appellate courts; Third, although the representatives to the Convention acknowledged the need for some scheme that would ensure the supremacy of national laws that would render the states subordinate to the national government in all matters of national concern. The states present disagreed on the extent to which such a clause should be extended.
[1] Dr. Franklin’s proposal for confederation was printed
in 2 J OF THE. CONT’L CONG. 1774-1789, 195 (1775), (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.
1905) available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00267))
[2] The resolve to draft a confederation agreement
was printed 5 J. OF THE CONT’L CONG. 1774-1789, 425 (1776), (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed. 1906) available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc0057))
[3] The record of transmittal was printed in 9 J. OF THE
CONT’L CONG. 1774-1789, 935 (1777), (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed. 1907) available at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00941))
[4]
The record of Maryland’s subscription to the Articles of Confederation was
printed in 19 J. OF THE CONT’L CONG. 1774-1789, 231-214, (1781)
https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00941))
