Political Zealotry

I fear the extremism of political parties like the Tea Party and the Pirate Party of the United States because they are based on political frenzy and to a lesser extent demagoguery. We as a Republic must remain mindful of Vice President Burr's final words to the Senate.

“This house is a sanctuary; a citadel of law, of order, and of liberty; it is here, here in this exalted refuge, if anywhere,
will be resistance made to the storms of political frenzy and the silent arts of corruption. And if the Constitution be destined ever to perish by the sacrilegious hands of the demagogue or the usurper, which God avert, its expiring agonies will be witnessed on this floor.” Aaron Burr's Farewell Address to the Senate March 1805.

My worries stem from the "Contract From America" specifically points one and five. Point one requires that the legislature identify the constitutional basis for each piece of legislation it passes. The provision could be abused to point where Article I sections 8 and 18 become meaningless due to an over literal interpretation. Furthermore the contract as it reads could be used to interfere with the judiciary's ability to exercise its functions under Article III.

In regards to point five the creation of blue ribbon panel capable of making determinations about the constitutionality of government agencies could potentially encroach and interfere with ability of the judicary to act in its capacity the arbiter on the constiutionality of government agencies because, the contract as written does not acknowledge the role of the judiciary in such cases. The idea that the legislature may audit agencies to assess their constitutionality is troubling because it is well settled that constitutionality of an agency or department rests with judiciary. See: Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co. , 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Washington Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).

Some have asserted that my position is tantamount to substitution in the sense that my opponents argue that I favor rendering Congress subservient to the Federal Judiciary, nothing is more removed from the light of truth. I seek only maintain the constitutionally mandated separation of powers contained within Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution.

It is true the Congress must attempt in good faith and due diligence ensure the constitutionality of legislation, but they sometimes forget as demonstrated by the Court Packing Plan of 1937 and the Ironclad Oath of 1862. Since Marbury and Laird were handed down in 1803 the judiciary on both the state and federal levels have reinforced and reaffirmed the judiciary’s position as the final arbiter of constitutionality when the constitutionality of a law, and by extension its legality is called into question. The judiciary has also consistently maintained that the legislature cannot encroach on its functions by expanding or diminishing them.

As elsewhere throughout the Constitution the section in question lays down principles which control the use of the power, and does not attempt meticulous or detailed directions. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of faithful compliance by Congress with the mandates of the fundamental law. Courts are reluctant to adjudge any statute in contravention of them. But, under our frame of government, no other place is provided where the citizen may be heard to urge that the law fails to conform to the limits set upon the use of a granted power. When such a contention comes here we naturally require a showing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress. How great is the extent of that range, when the subject is the promotion of the general welfare of the United States, we hardly need remark. But, despite the breadth of the legislative discretion, our duty to hear and to render judgment remains. If the statute plainly violates the stated principle of the Constitution we must so declare. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477, 1936 U.S. LEXIS 946, 1936-1 C.B. 421, 4 Ohio Op. 401, 16 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1289, 36-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9039, 102 A.L.R. 914 (1936)

See: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3290, 57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (1989) United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477, 1936 U.S. LEXIS 946, 1936-1 C.B. 421, 4 Ohio Op. 401, 16 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1289, 36-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9039, 102 A.L.R. 914 (1936); Evans v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 1, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2816 (1st Cir. Mass. 2008

I contend that these planks of the Tea Party's platform implicitly violate Article III of the Constitution by impinging on the right of the judiciary federal judiciary to adjudicate legal questions related to legislation passed by Congress in the event a controversy arises. These planks in essence would abrogate and vitiate over two centuries of precedent dating back to 1794.